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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAMES A. HATCH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THAIR H. BLACKBURN, 
Defendant. 
THAIR H. BLACKBURN, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ST. BENEDICT'S ENTERPRISES, INC., 
Third-Party Defendant. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals apply a more strict 
standard than that standard followed by the Supreme Court when 
it refused to consider the merits of the Appellants challenges 
to the trial court's findings? 
2. Did the Appellant discharge his duty to marshall 
all of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding bv 
setting forth the evidence in his Statement of the Case? 
3. Did the Appellant attempt to demonstrate that 
even when considering all the facts supporting the trial 
court's findings, such evidence was insufficient to support 
the trial court's findings? 
4. Should the merits of Appellant's appeal have 
been considered by the Court of Appeals? 




REFERENCE TO OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision 
on or about May 16f 1990. A copy of said Memorandum Decision 
is attached as an Addendum to this Petition. 
JURISDICTION 
The Memorandum Decision sought to be reviewed was 
filed by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1990. The Appellant 
petitioned the Court for re-hearing on May 30, 1990. Upon 
receipt of the Petition for Re-Hearing, the Court of Appeals 
ordered the entire record to be transmitted to the Court from 
the District Court pending the decision on the Petition for 
Re-Hearing. Having finally received the entire record, the 
Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Re-Hearing on August 
28, 1990. It is believed that Rules 4 and 46 of Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure confer upon the Supreme Court iurisdiction 
to review the decision in question by writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a judgment for architects fees. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant (Hatch) is a developer who was attempt-
ing to develop real property owned by St. Benedict's, a Third 
Party Defendant below but not a party to this appeal. The 
Defendant-Respondent (Blackburn) is an architect whose ser-
vices were used by Hatch in securing a long term lease with 
St. Benedict's. The actions of the parties came before the 
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Honorable Ronald Hyde of the Second District Court in and for 
Weber Countyf State of Utah on February 11, 1988. The trial 
court rendered judgment in favor of Blackburn. Hatch appealed 
the decision to the Utah Supreme Court. Pursuant to its 
statutory authority, the Utah Supreme Court transmitted the 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals. After beinq briefed and 
advised through oral argumentf the Utah Court of Appeals 
rendered its Memorandum Decision affirming the trial court's 
judgment. 
In 1983, Hatch had approached St. Benedict's with a 
proposal for the building of a medical office building on 
property adjacent to the St. Benedict's Hospital. T.8, 158. 
As a result of those discussions, St. Benedict's granted Hatch 
an option to lease up to four (4) acres of land. Because St. 
Benedict's wanted to review a site plan of the proposed build-
ing before entering into the long-term lease, Hatch requested 
Blackburn to prepare the drawings. T.8f 158. It was antici-
pated between Hatch and Blackburn that a standard form architect 
agreement (AIA Agreement) would be entered into between them, 
similar to their agreements in the past. T.12. However, 
before any agreement was signed, St. Benedict's decided aqainst 
the project. 
Hatch was able to revive the project and then again 
requested Blackburn to provide the necessary drawings. Because 
of the change in demands of St. Benedict's, Blackburn was 
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requested to prepare several different versions of the pro-
posed building. He went through at least five (5) schematics 
before finally meeting the approval of St. Benedict1s. Havinq 
met with their approval, St. Benedict's entered into a loner 
term lease with Hatch on or about May 16, 1986. By August 
1986/ Hatch notified Blackburn to go full steam ahead with the 
project and to prepare a written agreement to be submitted 
with the finance package. T.191f 194. At about the same 
time, Blackburn received $10,000.00 from Hatch as required 
under the AIA Agreement prepared by Blackburn. 
During this time, Blackburn presented a second AIA 
standard form agreement to Hatch for his signature. However, 
before the agreement was executed by the parties, St. Bene-
dict's again had a change of heart and indicated that it 
wanted to be released from its obligations under the lease 
agreement. Hatch was requested to submit a proposal for the 
buy out of the lease. As part of that proposal, he was asked 
to submit those expenses that he had incurred on the project. 
Hatch then requested Blackburn to prepare his final billing so 
that a figure could be negotiated with St. Benedict's. Accord-
ingly, Blackburn prepared his October 18, 1986 billing. 
The October 18, 1986 billing set forth the architect 
fees based on the percentages found in the AIA Agreement 
submitted to Hatch for signature. Those percentages were 
calculated against Blackburn's estimate of construction costs. 
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It included termination fees of $65f724.00 with a reference to 
Article 10.4 of the AIA Agreement for those fees. Tt also 
included $27/647.75 for those services that were rendered in 
the beginning when the project was originally cancelled by St. 
Benedict's. 
The October 18, 1986 billing was used by Hatch in 
his negotiations with St. Benedict's. Had St. Benedict's 
known that Blackburn's bill could not be substantiated, St. 
Benedict's likely would have negotiated for a lower figure. 
Dan Wolterman depo. pg. 24. A release was subsequently nego-
tiated and Hatch released St. Benedict's from its obligations 
under the lease. Hatch subsequently paid Blackburn another 
$18,000.00 for his fees. T.260. 
Fearing Hatch would not pay all of his billed fees, 
Blackburn filed a lien on the property in December 1986. 
Receiving notice of Blackburn's lienf St. Benedict's withheld 
its agreed payments from Hatch. Hatch then brought suit 
against Blackburn to have the lien removed. Blackburn counter 
sued for his fees. In addition/ he brought a third party 
action against St. Benedict's for foreclosure of his lien. 
The action came before the Honorable Ronald Hyde of 
the Second District Court. Hatch and Blackburn each testified. 
They also offered expert testimony through other architects. 
Blackburn's witnesses testified that Blackburn's fees were 
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reasonable. In addition to the expert witnesses and the 
parties testimonies, the depositions of two of St. Benedict's 
employees were offered into evidence. After hearing the 
evidence, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting 
judgment to Blackburn for the total amount of his October 18f 
1986 billing. The Court found that the AIA Agreement repre-
sented the fees agreed to and that the fees sought by 
Blackburn were reasonable. It also found that the reasonable 
value of Blackburn's services were the fees billed, less the 
termination fees. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) explained the standard for 
review of a judge's findings. 
When an appellant claims that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the trial court's find-
ings of fact, we do not weigh the evidence de 
novo; great deference is given to the trial 
court's findings, especially when they are based 
on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony. 
(Citations omitted). When the appeal is from a 
juries fact finding, we have said that the 
appellant has the obligation to marshall all the 
evidence in support of those findings and, 
considering that evidence in a light most favor-
able to the jury, still demonstrate that the 
findings lack substantial evidentiary support. 
(Citations omitted). The burden of proof is 
somewhat less when the appeal is from a judge's 
findings because we need only conclude that the 
findings are clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), 
but the mode of presentation and demonstration 
that must be followed by an appellant is the 
same. An appellant must marshall the evidence 
in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 
"against the clear weight of the evidence", thus 
making them "clearly erroneous". (Citation 
omitted). Whether the facts have been found by 
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a jury or a judge, appellant should recognize 
that the burden of overturning factual findings 
is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that we 
do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed 
facts. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals has con-
cluded that Hatch did not meet his burden because he failed to 
marshall all the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in a light 
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings. The Appellate Court concluded that 
instead of doing this, Hatch simply emphasized his own evi-
dence which is contrary to the findings. The Court therefore 
declined to reach the merits of Hatch's challenge to the trial 
court's findings. 
The conclusions of the Court of Appeals are erroneous 
for the following reasons. In his statement of the case, 
Hatch set forth the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings that Hatch retained Blackburn's architectural services 
and agreed to pay the fees set forth in the AIA Agreements. 
After setting forth the evidence, Hatch then demonstrated that 
the facts which the Court would have relied upon in its find-
ings were insufficient to support those findings. Soecifically, 
the evidence supporting the court's findings were: 
1) Blackburn's testimony as to his understanding of 
the Agreement; 
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2) The testimony of Blackburn's expert witnesses as 
to the reasonableness of the fees set forth in Blackburn's 
October 18, 1986 billing; 
3) Hatch's use of the October 18, 1986 billing in 
his negotiations with St. Benedict's. 
Hatch challenged the trial court's findings by 
demonstrating that the evidence referred to above was insuffi-
cient to support those findings for the following reasons: 
1) Blackburn's testimony concerning the calculation 
of the figures in the October 18, 1986 billing were inconsis-
tent with the provisions of the AIA Agreement which he was 
seeking to have enforced. This inconsistency was argued in 
the following areas: 
a) Blackburn's inclusion of $27,647.75 in the 
October 18, 1986 billing representing the work done prior 
to St. Benedict's first cancellation was inconsistent with 
Blackburn's own admissions that there was one proiect 
being worked on as well as being inconsistent with the 
terms of the AIA Agreement; 
b) The termination fees were inconsistent 
with the plain language of the AIA Agreement. Reference 
was made to the AIA Agreement. In fact, the AIA Agreement 
was the only evidence where such penalties were estab-
lished by the evidence as being agreed to between the 
parties; 
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c) The fees are calculated from "construction 
costs" as estimated by Blackburn. These "construction 
costs" are inconsistent with the provisions of the ATA 
Agreement. 
2) The expert testimony related to the percentages 
charged for the penalty in the regular fees rather than the 
total fee charged by Blackburn. This argument was supported 
by the admission to confusion between the witnesses over how 
termination penalties should be calculated, if they are to be 
calculated; 
3) The findings relative to Hatch's use of the 
October 18, 1986 billing were challenged by arguing the follow-
ing: 
a) Blackburn's own conduct contradicted the 
Court's findings; 
b) The depositions of Carol Stuckey and Dan 
Wolterman contradicted the Court's findings. 
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, Hatch argued 
that the Court's conclusions were contrary to the law in the 
following ways: 
1) The Court cannot fabricate a contract for the 
parties, especially in regards to penalties; 
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2) The October 18, 1986 billing is not enforceable 
as a separate contract because of a lack of consideration; 
3) Estoppel is not available as a theory because 
Blackburn did not rely on Hatch's actions to his detriment. 
By declining to reach the merits of Hatch's challen-
ges to the findings of the trial court, the Court of Appeals 
has set a standard higher than that standard set by the Supreme 
Court. Hatch had marshalled together the evidence supportinq 
the trial court's findings and has attempted to demonstrate 
that the trial court's findings are against the clear weight 
of the evidence. Hatch recognizes that great deference is 
given to the trial court's findings and that the burden of 
overturning the trial court's findings is a heavy one. He is 
not seeking to have the Appellate Court retry the matter. 
However, he is seeking to enforce his right to appeal, which 
the Court of appeals has effectively withdrawn by its overly 
restrictive standard for review. The Supreme Court's power of 
supervision is therefore needed and requested in protectinq 
this right. The merits of Hatch's appeal must be considered. 
DATED this day of September, 1990. 
Kevin V. Olsen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
on this day of September, 1990f postage prepaid to: 
Michael D. Lyon 
4768 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
James A. Hatch, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Thair H. Blackburn, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Second District, Weber County 
The Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
Attorneys: Kevin V. Olsen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Michael D. Lyon, Ogden, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
This case was tried to the court. There was conflicting 
evidence presented by the parties. Following trial, the court 
issued a detailed memorandum decision, from which followed the 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court's 
factual findings in this case adequately support its legal 
conclusions and the legal conclusions warrant the judgment that 
was entered. 
Hatch makes several arguments on appeal, but in essence 
he attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings. However, the trial court's findings are not 
properly challenged unless the evidence is correctly marshaled 
and shown to be insufficient. "To mount a successful attack on 
the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal 
all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). See In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Harker v. Condominiums 
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Hatch has not done this, but instead has simply emphasized his 
own evidence which is contrary to the findings. He suggests 
the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
MAY1M90 
.TJoonan 
hi * * Court 
M (Skirt «tf Apeeais 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880503-CA 
The fact that Hatch's evidence may have supported 
different findings—or even that much of the evidence is at 
odds with the findings—is of no consequence where the findings 
that were made are not shown, through the marshaling process/ 
to have been lacking adequate evidentiary support. See 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co, v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("When the duty to marshal is not properly 
discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges to 
the findings and accept the findings as valid."). This result 
is particularly appropriate where the key findings turn on the 
credibility determinations of the trial court, a matter on 
which we defer to that court's advantaged position. See 
Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)-
The single argument on appeal that survives the foregoing 
discussion is Hatch's claim that he is not liable for payment 
under the contract due to the ultimate frustration of the 
contract's purpose. Although the trial court made no findings 
or conclusions on this issue, Hatch claims that the court 
committed legal error in not precluding recovery by Blackburn 
on the grounds of frustration. While we doubt whether this 
doctrine would apply to the facts of this case, we need not 
consider the issue since it was not raised below and we will 
not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
See, e.g.. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. 
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah 1988). 
While Hatch's appeal is not frivolous, as Blackburn 
suggests, it is without merit. The judgment is accordingly 
affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
James A. Hatch, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Thair H. Blackburn, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
H L E O 
, AUG 2-3M990 
ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
Case No. 880503-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Orme. 
The court having considered the ^ petition for rehearing and 
the additional portions of the record filed in this Court on 
May 31, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING REHEARING was 
deposited in the United States mail. 
Kevin V. Olsen 
Anderson & Dunn 
Attorneys at Law 
2089 East 7000 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Michael D. Lyon, Esq, 
Lyon, Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones 
Attorney for Thair Blackburn 
4768 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
DATED this 29th day of August, 1990. 
By ^ ///'/>' .. /s*t 
Deputy Clerk 
